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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the spatial integration and efficiency between five central markets in southern Africa.  
The study uses data on commodity prices, trade flows, and transfer costs from central maize markets in 
Botswana, Malawi, and South Africa, and two in Mozambique, analyzed using the Parity Bounds Model, the 
Barrett-Li Model and some level 1 and non-parametric assessments. The study seeks to (1) evaluate the nature 
of price and trade relations, (2) establish the level of regional spatial integration, and (3) evaluate the level of 
efficiency in these markets.  
 
Results from the analysis indicate various forms of integration and efficiency outcomes for the sample markets. 
The central markets in South Africa and Botswana are characterized by significant levels of perfect integration, 
with higher frequency of imperfect integration with positive returns observed on the South Africa to Botswana 
trade route, and some occurrence of imperfect integration with negative returns observed in the opposite trade 
direction. For South Africa and Mozambique, trade is bidirectional and discontinuous, with very low frequency 
of perfect integration. Trade between South Africa and Mozambique’s Southern region generally fails to 
exhaust arbitrage profits, and though integrated, the market pair appears largely inefficient. South Africa and 
Malawi follow similar trends, although in this case perfect integration holds with higher frequency, and 
imperfect integration with negative return is occasionally observed from trade in the Malawi to South Africa 
trade route. Malawi and Mozambique’s Northern region exhibit perfect integration of a relatively high 
frequency, although imperfect integration with positive returns appears dominant on the Mozambique to 
Malawi route. Trade is bidirectional and discontinuous, predominantly in the Mozambique to Malawi direction. 
The market interactions between Botswana and Mozambique’s Southern region or Malawi follow a related 
trend exhibiting market segmentation as evidenced by the lack of trade. Efficiency holds with a fairly high 
frequency mostly in the form of segmented equilibrium, although significant segmented disequilibrium on the 
Botswana to Mozambique/Malawi route is also observed.  
 
Overall, the southern Africa maize markets considered in the sample seem to exhibit significant frequency of 
market integration, indicating tradability commodities and contestability of markets. Efficiency holds less 
frequently, although non-trivially, we observe that for those markets characterized by near continuous trade 
returns to arbitrage are exhausted for about 25% of the time. Often however, when trade is observed, efficiency 
appears to be weakened by insufficient arbitrage, possibly a result of non-cost barriers to trade (infrastructural 
or regulatory), imperfect information, or supply side constraints. For these markets, positive trade is also 
occasionally observed when arbitrage returns are negative, possibly due to contracting lags, and exchange rate 
fluctuations. Where trade is not observed, efficiency appears to hold with a slightly higher frequency (up to 
45%), so that the lack of trade is often justified by the lack of positive arbitrage returns. Significant segmented 
equilibrium also seems to characterize these markets, where again the lack of trade is consistent with expected 
arbitrage returns. For these markets, efficiency is also occasionally compromised by insufficient arbitrage, 
whereby trade sometime fails to occur even when the returns to arbitrage incentives appear favorable 
(segmented disequilibrium). Therefore in order of frequency, we observe a high frequency of imperfect 
integration (regimes 3) and segmented equilibrium (regime 6), a fairly regular occurrence of perfect integration 
(regimes 1 and 2), and irregular occurrence of segmented disequilibrium (regimes 4) and the negative returns 
type of imperfect integration (regime 5). In specific markets, import prices consistently exceed domestic market 
prices, an inefficient outcome that appears to result from the involvement of the state in grain trade, where 
market conduct often is driven by non-profit objectives. These results suggest a need for policy intervention in 
the areas of improved productivity and access to information to takes advantage of unexploited arbitrage 
opportunities, and in the longer term, dealing with structural barriers to trade that prevent market entry 
especially where positive returns are currently observed. In some cases though, the lack of trade is an efficient 
outcome that probably requires no immediate policy interventions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
For most countries in southern Africa, food security has traditionally been addressed through self-sufficiency, 
normally attained through widespread government involvement in the input and output markets for major food 
commodities. Food policies through the 1980’s have been characterized by input subsidies for farmers, fixed, 
pan-seasonal and pan-territorial pricing systems in commodity markets, mainly implemented through parastatal 
marketing boards, as well as subsidies and price controls at the wholesale and retail levels. Most of these 
policies have since been abandoned for more market oriented policies, either under the Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs), or domestic reforms, of the 1990’s. During the same period, most countries in the region 
joined the multilateral trading system, the World Trade Organization (WTO), just in time for the Uruguay 
Round tariff reforms, and on a regional level, two regional free trade agreements were ratified, under the 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), and bilateral preferential trading agreements continue to be negotiated.  These policy shifts have 
left in their wake a region characterized by a blend of food policy, with greater openness and a market-led 
economy in some countries, while substantial government involvement persists in others. In this policy 
environment, food supply volatility, price instability and weak coordination of trade policy remain fundamental 
problems. 
 
Improving intra-regional trade, through reduction of tariff and non-tariff measures has been widely advocated 
for as a critical piece in the food insecurity puzzle (SADC FANR 2003, World Bank DTIS, Mozambique 2004, 
Malawi 2002, Tschirley et al 2004, Mano 2003, Arlindo and Tschirley 2003, Moepeng 2003), and a vast 
amount of work has already gone into monitoring cross-border trade movements of food grains in the region 
(WFP/FEWS 2004-2006, USAID 1995). However, it has also been shown that the extent to which the benefits 
expected through greater market openness will be realized, depends significantly on how well integrated and 
efficient the markets are, both within and across borders (Ndlela 2002, Lewis 2002, Wobst 2002, Arndt 2005, 
World Bank 2002 and 2004).  This is because without integration and efficiency, no mechanism exists for price 
signals to be transmitted from food deficit to food surplus areas, prices may become volatile and fail to deliver 
accurate incentives, and producers may fail to specialize according to comparative advantage (Baulch 1997).  
 
In the southern Africa region, research efforts have focused on analyzing market integration at an intra-country 
level (Abdula 2005, Tostão and Brorsen 2005, Alemu and Baucuana 2006, Penzhorn and Arndt 2002, Traub et 
al 2004, Mabaya 2003, Mutambatsere 2002, Barrett 1997). Limited work has gone into evaluating how well 
integrated or efficient the maize markets are at the regional level, to ascertain if in fact trade is a viable food 
security strategy given existing market systems. The objective of this paper is to provide disaggregated bilateral 
analyses for distinct maize markets in a sample of four countries: Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and South 
Africa, to evaluate integration and efficiency, vis-à-vis current trade flows and existing marketing systems. The 
specific objectives are to: (1) evaluate the nature of price and trade relations among the sample markets, (2) 
establish the level of regional spatial integration, and (3) evaluate the level of efficiency in these maize markets. 
Data on maize prices, trade volumes and transfer costs are analyzed using several econometric procedures of 
evaluating market integration and equilibrium. First, the level of market price co-movements is evaluated using 
several level I tests, and second, market integration and efficiency is evaluated using Baulch’s Parity Bounds 
Model and the Barrett-Li Model.  
 
2. RESEARCH METHODS AND APPLICATIONS  
The evaluation of market efficiency is one of the very well studied subjects in economics. Traditionally, market 
integration has been used as a proxy for measuring market efficiency, through time series price-based methods 
such as bivariate correlations, the Granger causality test, the Ravallion model and the co-integration coefficient 
method, as known as level I procedures (Barrett 1996). As the limitations of these methods became apparent, 
more sophisticated methods have been developed, that incorporated transfer costs data, and later trade volumes 
in analyzing market efficiency (called level II and level III methods respectively). Before discussing the 
properties and application of these econometric tools, a few key concepts are defined.  
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2.1  Distinguishing Integration from Efficiency  
In a survey of spatial price analyses, Fackler and Goodwin 2001 distinguish among several concepts for 
markets interlinked in space, form or time: the spatial arbitrage condition, spatial integration and spatial 
efficiency. In this survey, the authors show that these terms, especially the ‘integration’ concept, have been 
‘loosely applied, such that the same word may involve distinctly different concepts in different studies’ (Fackler 
and Goodwin 2001). Barrett 2001 proposes a clear distinction between the concepts of integration and 
efficiency, where integration is restricted to the flow-based notion of tradability, whereas efficiency is taken as 
a price-based concept that relates to the satisfaction of equilibrium conditions. In this case market efficiency 
holds when all the gains from trade have been exhausted, and markets are in competitive equilibrium i.e. no 
potential for Pareto improvements exists through trade between markets. Following Enke 1951, Samuelson 
1952, and Takayama and Judge 1964, Barrett 2001 defines the spatial equilibrium concept as comprising three 
conditions:  
 Pi ≤ Pj + τji   if qji = 0   (1) 
Pi = Pj + τji  if qji є (0, q ̃ji)   (2) 
Pi ≥ Pj + τji  if qji = qj̃i   (3) 
where Pi and Pj are the prices in markets i and j, τji is the cost of transferring the good between these two 
markets, qji is the quantity traded and q̃ji is the maximal possible trade volume. From these conditions, we can 
see that trade is neither necessary nor sufficient for equilibrium (equilibrium without trade may occur as in 
condition 1, or trade without equilibrium if the left hand sides of condition 2 and 3 are not satisfied).  
 
Market integration represents the transfer of Walrasian excess demand from one market to another, manifest in 
actual or potential physical flow of goods, transmission of price shocks, or both. Positive trade flows, while 
sufficient, are not necessary for integration. Consequently, markets are said to be segmented when a product is 
not tradable between them. Note that with this definition of integration, prices equalization is not necessary, it 
suffices that the good is tradable between the two markets. These definitions of integration and efficiency are 
adopted in this paper. 
 
The following discussion briefly reviews some of the most widely employed tools for evaluating market 
integration / efficiency analysis, and the empirical applications of these methods, mainly to highlight some of 
the application challenges and the limitations of these methods as measures of market efficiency. The 
econometric structure of each model is summarized in Table 1.  
 
2.2  Measures of Integration and Efficiency: Empirical Applications  
Through the application of the market integration and efficiency analysis methods outlined above, the literature 
has revealed several merits and limitation of each of these methods. Correlation coefficients are among the 
earliest procedures to be used in evaluating market integration, employed first by scholars like Cummings 1967, 
and Lele 1967, in the evaluation of integration in Indian’s grain markets. Several weaknesses have been 
identified in the use of this procedure as a measure of integration, especially when applied to time series 
analyses. First, seasonal variations of price spreads make correlations unreliable measures of integration and 
competition, because correlations cannot separate integration-induced co-movement of prices, from long-run 
time trends and seasonality effects, or parallel price movements due to common endogenous trends, thus 
increase the risk of spurious integration. Correlations also are unreliable measures of integration in markets 
where inter-seasonal trade flow reversals are prevalent (with bidirectional trade), or when price series are 
heteroskedastic (true for most price data of reasonably high frequency) thus results generated could be 
unreliable (Barrett 1996). Additionally, as Barrett 1996 points out, contemporaneous correlation tests fail to 
capture natural lags in price responses, hence may over-estimate segmentation in markets experiencing such 
lags. These weaknesses have limited the use of correlations in isolation, although they have been continually 
employed as preliminary analyses in combination with more advanced market integration procedures.  
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The Granger causality test is another price-based procedure of evaluating integrating, a result of work by 
Granger 1969, and Sims 1972. Granger’s major contributions were defining the causality and feedback concepts 
in an explicit, testable manner, as well as proposing a methodology for such tests. As a measure of integration, 
the Granger causality tests are useful in showing what relationships between price variables, or between the 
contemporaneous values of a price series and its own lags, are statistically different from zero. In terms of 
applicability to the study of markets, especially in developing countries, the Granger causality test holds several 
appealing features. First, causality can be established from a set of price series data that are available at fairly 
high frequency (monthly or weekly) for most well developed agricultural markets, even in developing 
countries. Second, the econometric modeling process is fairly straight forward, requiring only basic 
econometric knowledge and statistical packages. As a result, application of this test procedure to the developing 
world markets has been fairly substantial. Some application, that also contributed to the development of the 
methodology, include Alexander and Wyeth 1994’s work in evaluating price integration in Indonesian rice 
markets, and Goodwin et al 1999, in evaluating integration of regional food markets in Russia1. Application to 
the southern Africa region cereals markets includes Muchopa 2000 and Mutambatsere 2002, to the maize 
markets in Zimbabwe, and Mabaya 1998 to the horticulture markets in Zimbabwe. These studies seem to reveal 
some significant causality in the markets studied. 
 
The Granger causality test, however, also has several limitations. First, accepting the causality hypothesis does 
not imply a cause-effect relationship between variables, but simply that one variable is useful in 
explaining/predicting another. As noted by Fackler and Goodwin 2001, causality can only show if a relationship 
between price variables exists, but does not say anything about the actual nature of any existing relationships. In 
addition, whereas the use of only price data has the advantages outlined above, the implicit assumptions made 
about the nature of transfer costs, by their exclusion from the analysis, may lead to inferential error. For 
example, in the event that transfer costs exceed price differentials, any number of results from the Granger 
causality tests (including lack of a causal relationship) may be consistent with efficiency (Barrett 1996). 
Another limitation of the Granger causality procedure is the possibility of spurious causality, often caused by 
missing relevant data or missing variables (Granger 1969).  For example, if the data were taken to consist of 
two price series, but in fact a third price series existed that ‘causes’ both the original price series, spurious 
causality may be found in the original price set. Likewise, spurious causality may occur when instantaneous 
causality2 is implied in a data series with missing readings (often a result of limited frequency in the data set), 
so that although no real causality exists, causality test results will be positive. Increasing the frequency of the 
data series, or widening the data set within which causality is defined would correct most of these problems.  
 
The co-integration procedure developed as a result of work by Engle and Granger3 in the early 1980’s and was 
an attempt to deal with the recurrent issue of non-stationarity in economic variables. This error correction 
procedure deals mainly with unit-root non-stationarity, representing a major advance from preceding 
procedures in that it enables unbiased evaluation of linear long-run relationships among non-stationary 
variables. Most economic variables tend to exhibit unit root non-stationarity (seemingly common in nominal 
price series data) that biases conventional approaches to inference (Fackler and Goodwin 2001). This is because 
a stationary price series typically reverts to a long run trend after a shock has been experienced, and this trend 
can be accurately estimated using regression procedures such as ordinary least squares (OLS). If, however, the 
price series follows a random walk, its variance is not finite, and a procedure like OLS would yield inconsistent 
parameter estimates (Pindyck 1997). The co-integration method recognizes that non-stationary variables 
generally have linear combinations across space or time that are stationary, therefore can exhibit stable long-run 
equilibrium tendencies. Co-integration tests for this kind of long-run equilibria4 (Fackler and Goodwin 2001). 
1 See Fackler and Goodwin 2001 for a detailed outline of these studies. 
2 When only contemporaneous prices of one series are significant in causing another, that is, if the current value of one price series is 
better predicted from the present value of another  
3 Significant contributions were also made by Palaskas and Harriss-White 1993, and Alexander and Wyeth 1994. 
4 Co-integration does not say much about period by period equilibria. 
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The application of the co-integration procedure to Africa, and elsewhere, has been fairly extensive, including 
Goodwin and Schroeder 1991 in analyzing the US cattle markets, Alderman 1993 in an analysis of grain 
markets for Ghana, Dercon 1995 in an analysis of teff marketing in Ethiopia, Lutz et al 1995 in analyzing the 
maize markets in Benin, and Bopape 2002 in evaluating potato markets in South Africa. The wide application 
of the method is indicative of both its relevance in analyzing the unit root non-stationary variables that make up 
most economic data, and its relative simplicity appeal. The co-integration procedure, however, has several 
limitations as a measure of integration and efficiency. First, it has been shown that co-integration is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for market equilibrium (Barrett 1996). This is because by excluding transfer costs the 
procedure imposes the assumption that these are constant through time. If however transfer costs are non-
stationary, co-integration inferences maybe biased. For example arbitrage between two markets may be efficient 
even when their prices series are not co-integrated. In other words, prices that are observed to drift apart with no 
apparent long term convergence may lead us to reject the co-integration hypothesis, even though the drift in 
prices may simply be a result of non-stationary transfer costs, rather than increasing arbitrage opportunities 
(Fackler and Goodwin 2001). McNew and Fackler 1997 support this observation, and show that prices in well 
integrated, efficient markets need not be co-integrated.  
 
Co-integration is also not sufficient for market equilibrium because price series may be co-integrated even 
though markets are not directly linked with each other, especially when transfer costs always exceed the price 
differentials. McNew and Fackler 1997 argue that if demand and supply forces are themselves co-integrated 
across markets, we might be led to conclude that prices are co-integrated regardless of whether markets are 
actually linked by trade, or whether the arbitrage conditions are satisfied. Some noteworthy extensions of the 
co-integration procedure include the threshold autoregressive and the threshold co-integration methods, a result 
of the work of Obstfeld and Taylor 1997, Prakash and Taylor 1997, and Goodwin and Pigott 1999. These 
procedures attempt to cope with the existence of non-tradability bands created by nontrivial transfer costs, 
however, the methods have been shown to retain the major limitation of price-based integration/efficiency 
methods that they attempt to deduce non-price information from variations in prices, thereby make important 
assumptions about the efficiency that they are supposed to be testing (Barrett 2001).  
 
Barrett 1996 shows that co-integration could be consistent with a negative price relationship, even though 
market integration suggests this correlation aught to be positive. Also, the ADF test normally used to evaluate 
co-integration imposes a common dynamic factor restriction on a static regression model, that must correspond 
to the properties of the data for the test to have high enough power to reject a false hypothesis. Empirical 
evidence however suggests limited existence of such common factors in economic variables, making the test 
non-optimal (Hendry and Juselius 1999). The evidence thus suggests that the co-integration method generally 
provides limited and potentially misleading results, especially when taken without careful consideration of 
underlying price-costs relations.  
 
The Ravallion model (1986) developed as an attempt to address some of the inferential limitations of earlier 
integration methods such as correlations, by appropriately handling autocorrelation, common inflationary 
trends, and seasonality in the modeling process. This method distinguishes between short-run and long-run 
relations among price variables. An error-correction, dynamic regression based method, the Ravallion model 
assumes price shocks originating from one central market with weakly exogenous prices, where short run 
market integration holds if price shocks are immediately transmitted between markets, and long-run market 
integration holds when market prices are equalized over time. The Ravallion model extends the static bivariate 
method into a dynamic model by permitting each local price series to have its own dynamic structure, thus 
avoid the inferential dangers of the simple bivariate models arising from such properties as correlation and 
seasonality. The usefulness of this model, and practicality in application, has encouraged substantial application 
in the market integration literature. Some of the early applications of this procedure include Ravallion 1986 
who used the model to evaluate spatial integration among Bangladesh rice markets, Benson and Faminow 1992 
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in their application of the model to the Canadian hog markets, and Jordan and Van Sickel 1995 in an application 
to the US and Mexican tomato markets.  
 
One of the main weaknesses of the Ravallion model lies in its main assumption, that transfer costs are either 
additive or proportional and will not significantly influence integration. This assumption, if violated, may bias 
integration results substantially. In addition, the model restricts a radial configuration of markets, where each 
subsidiary or regional market must be linked directly to a pre-determined central market. In practice, however, 
some markets are only connected to the central market indirectly, through direct linkages to other subsidiary 
markets. The model does not capture this type of integration. As Barrett 1996 notes, the inter-seasonal flow 
reversals and direct links between subsidiary markets violate the radial markets assumption. In addition, 
discontinuous trade or seasonal variation of marketing margins may cause the rejection of the integration 
hypothesis in the Ravallion model even when markets are integrated (Baulch 1994). Finally, Ravallion 1986 
consents that the model can only evaluate integration, which is itself not sufficient for the optimality of a 
competitive equilibrium. Thus we cannot make spatial efficiency inferences from the model’s results.             
    
Switching regimes models are level II time series procedures of evaluating spatial integration, that attempt to 
describe and distinguish between different forms of imperfect integration between markets. The method was 
developed by Spiller and Haung 1986, and Spiller and Wood 1988, who provided a framework for analyzing 
imperfectly integrated market networks, using a little more than just price data – by incorporating transfer costs 
data into the analysis. Their model identifies three different market regimes, and a framework to estimate the 
probability of being in each of these regimes, conditional on the size of price spreads relative to transfer costs. 
Sexton, Kling and Carman 1991 modified and applied this model in their study of the US celery markets, by 
slightly redefining the market regimes representing efficient arbitrage, relative shortage, and relative glut, and 
employing a regression approach. These modifications allow for the evaluation of efficiency, rather than just 
integration, and enable us to generate evidence on the magnitude of marketing margins, product substitutability 
and competitiveness of markets (Sexton, Kling and Carman 1991). Notice though that the transfer costs data is 
inferred from the model, and the only purely exogenous variables are still the price series. However, where 
implicit parity bounds5 exist, the process of estimating transfer costs from price becomes differentials highly 
problematic if such costs are endogenously determined (Baulch, 1994). 
 
Baulch 1997 also made major contributions to switching regimes modeling, by proposing the parity bounds 
model (PBM), a version of switching regimes that differs from the Spiller-Haung model in that in this case, 
regimes correspond to prices within, on and outside a defined arbitrage band. This maximum-likelihood based 
estimator relies on exogenous transaction cost data to estimate the probability of attaining inter-market arbitrage 
conditions, its main advantage over the level I procedures discussed earlier. The central idea behind the PBM is 
that intermarket price spreads can be compared with exact information on transfer costs for at least one time 
period, making it possible to establish probabilistic limits within which the spatial conditions are likely to be 
binding in other periods.  Baulch 1997 argues that because level I tests fail to recognize the pivotal role of 
transfer costs, the discontinuous trade flows, and the non-linearities implied by spatial arbitrage conditions, 
these predominantly linear tests for market integration are often inappropriate for developing countries. The 
PBM takes into account all these important market properties, allowing for the possibility of discontinuous 
trade, simultaneous price determination, inter-period transfer costs variability, and common endogenous trends. 
The model also makes no a priori assumptions about the nature of marketing margins, and may be estimated 
using incomplete time series data (Baulch 1997).  
 
The main problem experienced in applying the PBM though is that transfer costs are extremely difficult to 
measure. Barrett 2001 offers a simple decomposition of the transfer costs term including numerous 
5 Occur when two markets trade with each other infrequently but have a third regular, mutual trading partner (Baulch 1994). 
 8
                                                          
components6 of which transport is but one of a long list – this term also usually contain certain unobservable 
aspects such as risk and suck costs. Thus the accuracy with which transfer costs can be measured also 
influences credibility of results. Additionally, the PBM still fails to handle bidirectional trade and non-
stationary transfer costs, and by excluding trade data, fails to take advantage of the information therein, limiting 
the inferential capacity of the model (Barrett, Li and Bailey 2000). Baulch 1997 also points out that the PBM 
though well adapted for price endogeneity and common trends does not have the flexibility of to account for 
lagged price adjustments.  
 
The Barrett-Li model, discussed in greater detail in section 3.1 is an extension of parity bounds (Baulch 1997) 
and switching regime (Spiller and Haung 1986, Sexton, Kling and Carman 1991) procedures, due to Barrett and 
Li 2001. This method is an improvement on Baulch’s method in that it incorporates trade volumes in the 
analysis of market efficiency. It is also one of the first attempts at isolating integration from equilibrium, and 
distinguishing conditions under which both might hold. It also enables us to deal with discontinuous and 
bidirectional trade data, and by allowing the identification of seasons or periods in which trade occurs, enables 
direct estimation of the frequencies with which a variety of market conditions occur, such as competitive and 
segmented equilibrium, or imperfect integrated (Barrett, Li and Bailey 2000). 
 
Switching regimes models, in general, also have been shown to suffer from inconsistent estimation of the price 
spreads probability distributions, making results sensitive to choice of distributions (Fackler and Goodwin 
2001). Fackler and Goodwin 2001 also argue that switching regimes models can be viewed as nothing more 
than flexible models of the price spread distribution, so that the accuracy of results rests much on the 
appropriateness of the distributional assumptions. They also argue that the assumption of no serial correlations 
among cost variables may not be plausible.  
 
3. DATA AND METHODS  
3.1  Methods 
Level I: Price-based analyses  
The paper adopts the following format of analysis: first, a comprehensive explanatory data analysis is 
performed using four level I procedures: bivariate correlations, Granger causality tests, co-integration, and the 
Ravallion model, in collaboration some non-parametric analyses. Notwithstanding limitations as measures of 
market efficiency, level I tests are useful in describing market interactions, without attempting to draw 
conclusions on integration or efficiency. For example, these methods are useful in understanding the price 
discovery mechanism within markets, the expected degree and direction of shock transmissions, and the long 
run trend in price movements. Table 1 provides a brief description of the econometric modeling process for 
these procedures.  
 
Level II: Parity Bounds Model 
Baulch 1997’s parity bounds model (PBM) is used to identify regimes of perfect integration, imperfect 
integration and market segmentation between market pairs. This maximum-likelihood based estimator relies on 
exogenous transfer costs data to estimate the probability of attaining inter-market arbitrage conditions. Baulch’s 
model is well suited for the markets under study in this paper, since it allows for discontinuous transfer costs 
data to be employed. The main limitation of the PBM is that it imposes restrictions of continuity on trade that, if 
violated, could lead to erroneous conclusions on efficiency. Therefore for those markets where reasonably 
frequent bilateral trade data are available, the Barrett-Li Model (BLM) analysis is applied instead. The PBM is 
essentially a restricted form of the Barrett-Li model (discussed in greater detail in the following section) in 
which trade is assumed to be continuously positive or zero between market pairs, so that only three market 
6 Barrett identifies the following components: transport costs, costs associated with insurance, financing, hedging, contracting and 
satisfying technical barriers to trade such as complying with safety standards, exogenous transfer costs such as underwriting fees and 
testing charges, duties, and a whole host of unmeasurable transfer costs associated with doing business (opportunity costs of 
entrepreneurial time, search costs, risk, price and exchange rate variability etc) (Barrett 2001). 
conditions are identified. For conciseness, only the Barrett-Li model is discussed in detail, the structure of 
Baulch’s PBM can be subsequently deduced. 
 
Table 1: Measures of Integration and Efficiency  
LEVEL 1 
Bivariate Correlations ρ(Pi,Pj)  =  Cov (Pi, Pj)  (4) 
                  σ(Pi).σ(Pj) 
where ρ is the correlation coefficient, Pi and Pj are the commodity prices in two distinct markets 
i and j, Cov (Pi, Pj) is the covariance of the commodity prices in markets i and j, and σ(Pi) and 
σ(Pj) are standard deviations of the respective price series. 
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where Pi,t is the price in market i at time t, Pi,t-s is the sth lag of the price in market i, and n is the 
number of lags. Test if βs is significantly different from 0. 
Co-integration Pi,t   =   α + βPj,t + ξi,t                                (7)   
where ξi,t follows an autoregressive process : ξi,t  =  α0 + α1ξi,t-1 +… + αqξi,t-q  +  νt. Test for the 
stationarity of the error term, ξi,t 
Ravallion 
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where Pi,t is the price in regional market i at time t, P1,t is the price in a central market, and Xi,t is 
the vector of characteristics influencing regional markets. Short run market integration holds if 
βi0 = 1 and αis = βis = 0 for all s = 1,…,n. Weak short-run integration holds when βi0=1 and ∑ns=1 
αis + ∑ns=1 βis = 0, and long-run market integration holds when ∑ns=1 αis + ∑ns=0 βis = 1. 
LEVEL II 
Switching Regimes:  
Spiller-Haung  
Regime 1 Pjt – Pit > rijt , market i ships to market j  (10) 
Regime 2 Pjt – Pit < – rjit , market j ships to market i  (11) 
Regime 3 –rjit < Pjt – Pit < rijt  , no trade occurs              (12) 
where Pjt represents market prices in market j and rijt is the cost of transferring goods from 
market i to market j, at time t. Imperfect integration holds in regimes I and II, and market 
segmentation holds in regime III. Estimates the probability of being in each regime. 
Switching Regimes:  
Sexton, Kling and 
Carman 
Regime 1 Pjt – Pit < rijt (13) 
Regime 2 Pjt – Pit > rijt (14) 
Regime 3 Pjt – Pit = rijt     (15) 
Market efficiency holds in regime 3, and is tested by the hypothesis that the probability of being 
in this regime is equal to 1.  
Parity Bounds Model: 
Baulch  
Regime 1: Pjt – Pit = rijt           (16) 
Regime 2: Pjt – Pit < rijt           (17) 
Regime 3: Pjt – Pit > rijt           (18) 
If production and consumption are completely specialized, only regime 1 is consistent with 
integration, whereas integration would also hold under regime 2 with non-specialized production 
and consumption. Regime 3 implies lack of integration in either case. 
LEVEL III 
Barrett-Li Model  In text  
 
 
 
Level III: The Barrett-Li Model 
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The Barrett-Li model is used to establish direction specific integration and equilibrium for those market pairs 
for which reasonable credible trade data were available. The BLM is a maximum likelihood-based method that 
incorporates price, transfer costs and trade flow data to analyze market performance. This model represents 
major improvements from typical level II switching regimes in two ways: first, it provides a clear, testable 
distinction between market integration and competitive market equilibrium, and second, it uses information on 
trade flows, from which useful information on continuity and direction of trade can be deduced and used to 
estimate frequencies with which a variety of market conditions occur. In this model, market integration implies 
the transfer of excess demand from one market to another, manifest in the physical flow of commodity 
(tradability) and/or the transmission of price shocks from one market to another (contestability). Competitive 
equilibrium on the other hand refers to the state in which the marginal profits from arbitrage equal zero, i.e. 
price differentials move one-to-one with costs of spatial arbitrage. The BLM is also capable of dealing with 
market integration and efficiency for commodities that are not entirely homogenous, since it takes into 
consideration seasonal or contemporaneous bidirectional trade (normally a result of intra-industry trade) 
(Barrett and Li 2002). 
 
The model identifies four distinct market conditions: perfect integration, segmented equilibrium, imperfect 
integration and segmented disequilibrium: let Pit be the price in market i at time t, Cjit the transfer costs between 
markets i and j at time t, Rjit = Pit - Pjt - Cjit the marginal returns from arbitrage between markets i and j at time t, 
Tjit the volume of trade between markets i and j at time t, and λk the estimated probability associated with 
regime k. Six market regimes are identified: 
Regime 1: Rjit = 0  and Tjit > 0 , perfect integration with trade   (19) 
Regime 2: Rjit = 0  and Tjit = 0 , perfect integration without trade  (20) 
Regime 3: Rjit > 0  and Tjit > 0 , inefficient integration    (21) 
Regime 4:  Rjit > 0  and Tjit = 0 , segmented disequilibrium   (22) 
Regime 5: Rjit < 0  and Tjit > 0 , inefficient integration    (23) 
Regime 6: Rjit < 0  and Tjit = 0, segmented equilibrium    (24) 
Competitive equilibrium prevails whenever the inter-market arbitrage condition holds with equality, or when 
transfer costs exceed price differentials so that no trade occurs: 
Rjit ≤ 0 ;  or Rjit < 0  and Tjit = 0   (25) 
Market integration holds whenever positive trade is observed or the inter-market arbitrage condition is binding:  
Tjit > 0;  or Rjit = 0    (26) 
Under perfect integration, arbitrage rents are exhausted and trade may or may not take place – both market 
integration and competitive equilibrium hold. Under segmented equilibrium, trade does not occur since rents are 
negative – markets are not integrated, but are in competitive equilibrium. Under imperfect integration, trade 
occurs but either rents are not exhausted or transfer costs exceed price differentials. In this case, markets are 
integrated but not in competitive equilibrium. By establishing whether or not trade occurred between distinct 
markets, one can immediately confirm integration of markets. Segmented disequilibrium holds when trade does 
not occur even though rents are positive; neither integration nor equilibrium holds in this case.  
 
A joint probability distribution can be estimated, for Tjit and Rjit, where condition (25) prevails with estimated 
probability λ1 + λ2 + λ6, and (26) with estimated probability λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ5.  The maximum likelihood method 
is then used to establish the probability of being in each regime. Following Baulch’s logic for a parity bounds 
model, we use the available isolated point estimates of transfer costs to establish a confidence interval (to 
establish lower and upper parity bounds) within which the deflated transfer costs are allowed to vary, then 
assess the probability of being in each regime, given these parity bounds. The deviation of returns to arbitrage 
in each period from the null hypothesis of perfect integration (or zero returns to arbitrage) is captured by a 
systematic error term vt, assumed to be normally distributed with mean α and variance σ2v, plus a positive error 
term ut that is added when Rjit > 0 and subtracted when Rjit < 0. ut is assumed to follow a half normal 
distribution with variance σ2u, and captures the extent to which price differentials deviate from the parity 
bounds (Baulch 1994). A non-zero α, on the other hand, captures the random components of measurement error 
or the unobservable component of transfer costs (Barrett and Li 2001). Following Weinstein 1964, on summing 
a normally and half-normally distributed variable, we can define the probability density functions for each 
regime as follows:  
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The maximum likelihood function for this parity bounds model is given by: 
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and the parameters λ1 to λ6, α, σv and σu can then be estimated by optimizing In(L) with respect to each 
parameter. Tjit is a dummy variable, taking values 0 when trade occurs and 1 when trade does not occur. Ф[.] is 
the normal cumulative distribution function, and φ[.] the probability density function.  
 
Baulch’s PBM is similar to the model outlined above, with 2 major exceptions, first that in the PBM trade does 
not explicitly enter the analysis, and second that no allowance is made for measurement error in the modeling 
process. Consequently, regimes are defined only by the value of Rjit, probability density functions are distinctly 
defined for the three regimes, and in the original Baulch model α is set equal to zero.  In the form of the Parity 
Bounds model used in this analysis, the α = 0 restriction is relaxed to improve precision of regime probability 
estimates.     
 
A few limitations of the BLM are worth mentioning. First, this procedure is fairly data intensive, and transfers 
costs and trade data of the required frequency are not always readily available. Second, this model offers only 
static comparisons, and does not permit analysis of the dynamics of inter-temporal adjustment to short-run 
deviations from long run equilibrium (Barrett 2001). The model also suffers some of the weaknesses outlined 
earlier for switching regimes model: it also assumes serial independence of price and transfer costs data, and is 
sensitive to the underlying distribution assumptions (Barrett and Li 2001, Fackler and Goodwin 2001).  
 
3.2 Data and Sources  
A sample of five distinct markets in southern Africa is analyzed in this paper: Gaborone in Botswana, Gauteng 
in South Africa, Blantyre in Malawi, and Maputo and Mocuba in Mozambique (see figure 1). For Mozambique, 
two markets are included: Maputo as the central market for the southern region, and Mocuba the representative 
market for the northern region7. The differences between these two regions of Mozambique: the later a net 
buyer of maize and the former a net seller, as well as the supposed ‘market segmentation’ due to poor transport 
networks between the regions often highlighted in the literature8, and the distinct regional alignment in cross-
border trade with other sample markets, necessitate the individual representation of these two regions in the 
analysis. Generally, the choice of markets was based primarily on centrality of each market in the countries 
under study, each representing one of the largest consumer and/or producer markets in each country. Market 
choice was also based on data availability, and on diversity of trade relations among the sample markets: 
whereas the Botswana and South Africa markets are engaged in continuous trade with no tariffs, South Africa 
and southern Mozambique (Malawi and northern Mozambique) are characterized by mostly unidirectional 
                                                          
7 The Northern region here comprises the four regions: Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Zambezia, and the Southern region is 
made up of Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane.  
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8 See Arndt forthcoming, Tostão and Brorsen 2005  
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continuous, protected trade, South Africa and Malawi by bidirectional discontinuous trade, and Botswana and 
Malawi/Mozambique by very little trade. These markets thus make up an interesting sample, in which some 
typical assumptions about market connectedness and efficiency can be tested.  
 
Monthly time series data on maize wholesale prices from each of these markets Pjt, direction-specific transfer 
costs between any two markets Cjit, and direction-specific trade volumes for any two markets Tjit, are used in 
this analysis. The sources of these data are also summarized in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Data and Sources  
SOURCE  
Price  Trade flows Hauling costs Tariff Rates Exchange Rates, 
Consumer Indices  
Fuel Prices  
Botswana  BAMB WITS, CSO, 
FAOSTAT  
Studies* 
 
WITS, CSO CSO, BoB   CSO 
South Africa 
  
 NDA, SAFEX WITS, FAOSTAT, 
TIPS   
WB, SAGIS, 
Studies  
WITS, DTI STATS SA, 
Reserve Bank 
DME  
Malawi  MISD WITS, FEWS, 
FAOSTAT   
WB,  
Studies  
WITS, Revenue 
Authority  
NSO, Reserve 
Bank 
MoE 
Mozambique SIMA WITS, FEWS, 
FAOSTAT  
WB, SIMA, 
MoTI, Studies  
WITS  INE  MoE 
Abbreviations: Central Statistics Office (CSO), Bank of Botswana (BoB), World Bank (WB), Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board (BAMB), 
Food Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET), Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) online database FAOSTAT, Department of 
Market Information Services (MISD), Ministry of Energy (MoE), National Statistics Office (NSO), World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) – 
World Bank trade database, Trade and Industry Policy Strategies (TIPS), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), National Department of 
Agriculture (NDA), South African Grain Information Services (SAGIS),  South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX), National Department of 
Minerals and Energy (NDME), National Institute of Statistics (INE), Agricultural Marketing System under the Ministry of Agriculture (SIMA), 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI). *Studies are outlined in-text. 
 
The complete data set comprised monthly time series wholesale price data available for each market for the 
time period: June 1994 to December of 2002, making up 102 observations. All of the price statistics were 
reported in local currency, and were converted to the US$ equivalents using the appropriate exchange rate. The 
US$ equivalents were used as the ‘normalized’ price series without further inflation adjustments. Occasionally 
in the analyses, reference is made to the ‘trade unit values’ of maize, computed as the source/destination 
specific per unit value of the maize traded. As shown later, these values sometimes differ from the market 
prices prevailing in either the source or destination markets, and may help explain perceived discrepancies in 
trade flows given the market price determined returns to arbitrage. Note that these ‘trade unit values’ are 
national averages (rather than market specific values), obtained by dividing the total value of maize traded 
between two countries as it appears at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System of trade records, with the 
total quantity traded. Their use is thus restricted mainly to the discussion of results.         
 
The transfer costs variable was challenging to construct, given incomplete and asymmetric data availability for 
the sample countries. The series was derived primarily from the per km hauling costs for road and rail 
transportation estimated in the World Bank’s diagnostic trade integration studies for Malawi and Mozambique 
(2001), Tostão and Brorsen 2005, SADC freight studies by Vink et al 2002, Kandiero et at 2005, Erero and van 
Heerman 2005, the Food Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN) 2003, and 
from SAGIS 2005. From these sources, several point estimates for 2001 and 2002 are obtained, and following 
Baulch 1997, are extrapolated to cover the study period using data of varying degrees of completeness, on fuel 
prices, distance between markets and transport cost indices. Often, conservative and extreme point estimates of 
transfer costs are offered in the literature. In this study the average of these estimates was used, allowing for 
variability in the transport cost index to determine seasonal fluctuations of these costs. Data on tariff rates were 
used to estimate the tariff costs per unit traded between specific markets, which were added to the hauling costs 
estimates. In some cases (specifically Mozambique), the Value Added Tax (VAT) on imported maize grain is 
observed to be quite high, and is often considered trade restrictive (Tschirley et al 2005). In this analysis, since 
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VAT is an internal tax that is often subject to exemption, we refer to it only in explaining observed trade flows, 
rather than as part of the transfer cost. Costs such as handling, border inefficiency, and insurance costs also 
could not be captured in the transfer costs estimates used here, however considering that maize is a non-
perishable, low-value commodity, we might expect border losses due to spoilage, and insurance costs, to be 
relatively small. Note that transfer costs between any given market pair are not symmetric for the reasons that 
the fuel prices and consumer indices are market specific, and tariff rates differ between countries at specific 
time periods. 
 
Trade statistics, though generally available from various sources for the study period, are almost exclusively 
available in annual form. For the sample countries, more frequent trade statistics are limited to some historic 
quarterly statistics for Botswana, a few recent monthly statistics for South Africa available from the Department 
of Trade and Industry, and for Malawi and Mozambique, monthly trade statistics for specific trade routes 
available from Food Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET)’s cross border trade monitoring studies. The 
major challenge in consolidating the trade flow variable was that the most comprehensive bilateral trade time 
series, available from WITS, is reported on an annual basis, whereas the monthly statistics such as those from 
FEWS NET were only available for recent years, often falling outside of the study period. Moreover, with the 
exception of FEWS NET data, trade statistics only tell country level bilateral flows, but do not identify exactly 
what markets the commodity originated from, or where it is destined. In this paper, the trade dummy variable 
used in the Barrett-Li analysis was derived from the annual statistics, using the monthly data where they exist to 
predict the months in which trade is likely to have occurred. To handle the issues of source and destination of 
reported trade, trade literature for the region9 were referred to. Because of these numerous assumptions and 
adjustments made to derive frequent, reasonably accurate trade variables could only be derived for three market 
pairs: Gaborone and Gauteng, Gauteng and Maputo, and Mocuba and Blantyre, the only three market pairs 
included in the BLM analysis. For the rest of the market pairs, the PBM is used instead, in collaboration with 
the more accurate annual trade statistics to explain trade relations.   
 
Overall, the maize prices series (US Dollar equivalent) for the sample markets: Gaborone, Gauteng, Blantyre, 
Maputo, and Mocuba are volatile, non-stationary processes, integrated of order 1. Direction specific transfer 
costs are also shown to be unit root processes. Higher price volatility is observed for Mocuba, Maputo and 
Blantyre, with Gauteng and Gaborone prices appearing to be the least volatile. The stationary, first-differenced 
price and transfer costs series were used with appropriate model adjustments for much of the analyses.  
 
3.3  Description of Markets  
This section offers a non-parametric description of the markets to help explain some of the trends observed in 
the econometric assessments that follow, and to assess the goodness of fit for the variable distributions and 
other statistical restrictions on the data imposed by the maximum likelihood estimations performed later. 
Initially, the main characteristics of each market are summarized in Tables 3 and 4, and thereafter, a description 
of returns to arbitrage between markets is provided (Figure 2). Figure 1 shows the location of the markets in the 
sample (Gauteng is the region of South Africa encompassing the cities Johannesburg and Pretoria), some of the 
major ports, the transportation networks linking them together and the estimated distances between the markets 
included in the sample. For clarity of presentation, the figure does not show most of the road networks, only 
those that link major ports for which rail does not exist are shown.  
 
Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution of returns to arbitrage between distinct markets given price and 
transfer costs movements. In this figure, the prevailing market prices in the central markets of the sample 
countries are used to compute the price spreads. Similar assessments are also performed using ‘trade unit 
values’ of maize (see Appendix 1), shown in this study to sometimes differ from the prevailing market prices in 
either the exporting or importing countries. This second exercise is important in that when trade occurs between 
9 FANRPAN publications, SADC publications, MSU Food Security studies, TIPS publications among others (see Reference section) 
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two countries, the prices received for exports may contain more accurate information on returns to arbitrage 
than the prices prevailing on the domestic markets. Differences between market prices and trade unit values 
may also have non-trivial implications on market efficiency, bearing in mind though the limitation in recording 
accuracy and precision of the latter, that are only national average values.  
 
Table 3: Trade Frequencies, Annual Between Countries: 1994 to 2005 
               To 
From  South Africa Botswana  Mozambique  Malawi 
South Africa  - 100% 100% 89% 
Botswana  100% - 0% 0% 
Mozambique 56% 0% - 78% 
Malawi 67% 0% 44% - 
Source: WITS 2005  
 
Table 4: Description of Sample Markets  
 BOTSWANA  MALAWI  MOZAMBIQUE  SOUTH AFRICA 
Cereal production  10% of aggregate 
needs  
1.2-2.5 million tons per 
year 
1.25 million tons per 
year 
10 million tons per year 
Cereals 
consumption  
80,000 tons per year  1.5million tons per year  1.35 million tons per 
year 
7.5 million tons per year 
Imports  71,000 tons per year  125,000 tons (about 8.5% 
of aggregate needs) per 
year  
200,000 tons a year 550,000 tons per year 
Exports  1,000 tons per year  18,500 tons per year 7,000 tons per year 1.5 million tons per year  
Major regional 
trading partners 
South Africa (95% of 
imports, 75% of 
exports), Namibia 
(14% of exports), 
Zimbabwe (5% of 
imports) 
 
Mozambique (60% of 
imports), South Africa 
(25% of total imports, 
3.5% of total exports), 
Zimbabwe (24% of 
exports), Tanzania (14% of 
exports), Zambia (3% of 
total imports, 0.1% of total 
exports) 
South Africa (80% of 
imports), Swaziland 
(3.6% of imports), 
Malawi (close to 60% of 
total exports). Limited 
trade with Zimbabwe, 
Namibia, Angola and 
DRC 
Zimbabwe (40% of total 
exports, 1.5% of total 
imports, 75% of regional 
imports)10, Botswana (5-
7% of total exports), 
Malawi and Mozambique 
(10% of exports, ≈0.1% 
of imports)  
Tariffs and taxes 
on maize  
0% for SACU imports  
6.7c/kg on grain, 
10c/kg on maize flour  
0% for COMESA imports  
0% on grain, 15% on 
maize flour 
0% on maize grain, 25% 
on maize flour, 17% 
VAT on imported grain 
0% for SACU imports 
6.7c/kg on grain, 10c/kg 
on maize flour 
 
 GABORONE  BLANTYRE MAPUTO GAUTENG 
Geographic Status  Capital City Commercial Capital Capital Province Capital Province 
Population  270,000 (15% of total) 502, 000 (1/3 of urban 
population, 4% of total)  
> 1 million (7.5% of 
total) 
3.2 million, 17% of total 
Maize production  - 15.8% of aggregate  2% of aggregate   5% of aggregate  
Sources: WITS, FAOSTAT, National statistics offices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Most of South Africa’s imports are from the international market, and in aggregate, South Africa’s imports from Zimbabwe are 
only 1.75% of total imports. 
 
          Figure 1: Ports, Inland Terminals and Main Transit Routes for SADC States  
 
Source: FANRPAN/ MSU Maize Trade Project, 2005 (updated by authors).   
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         Figure 2: Returns to arbitrage - market price estimates   
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DISTANCE BETWEEN MARKETS: 
Road                              
Gauteng to Gaborone – 358km                          
Gauteng to Maputo – 602km                             
Gauteng to Blantyre – 1905km                          
Blantyre to Maputo – 1780km  
Maputo to Mocuba – 1320 km 
Blantyre to Mocuba – 310 km  
 
  Major ports 
Rail
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An assessment of the sources of imports and destinations of exports for the SADC region indicates that 
although intra-regional trade generally contributes a small proportion of total trade volumes (around 5% of 
aggregate trade), the trend is significantly different for trade of maize. Statistics indicate that formal trade 
among SADC countries accounts for over 95% of total maize exports and about 80% of maize imports, in 
addition to an estimated 270,000tons (about 8.5% of total trade quantity) traded informally between 
neighboring states (WITS 2005, FEWS NET 2005, USAID 1995). Botswana, a deficit producer of maize, is 
closely linked to South Africa through tariff-free trade under the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 
The southern region of Mozambique (in which Maputo is located) is also a maize deficit region (producing only 
10% of national product output, compared to 40% in the Central region and 50% in the Northern region) that 
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relies substantially on South Africa for imports. Malawi sources most of its imports from the maize surplus 
northern region of Mozambique, with substantial imports from South Africa, and occasional exports to parts of 
the region also observed. No significant trade is recorded between Botswana and either Malawi or 
Mozambique.  
 
Price and transfer costs statistics indicate that the prices in Gaborone exceed Gauteng prices for most of the 
study period, and that the returns to arbitrage from trading grain from Gauteng to Gaborone are positive about 
90% of the time. Conversely for the Gaborone to Gauteng trade direction, returns to arbitrage are almost always 
negative. Blantyre maize prices are higher than Gauteng prices for most of the study period, and the returns to 
arbitrage on the Gauteng to Blantyre trade route are positive for about 70% of the time. The Blantyre to 
Gauteng trade route records consistent negative returns to arbitrage. For the Gauteng-Maputo markets pair we 
observe again a one-sided trend in positive returns to arbitrage, with Maputo prices consistently exceeding the 
market prices for Gauteng.  
 
The Maputo-Blantyre market pair is characterized by alternating positive and negative price differences, with 
the prices in Blantyre exceeding Maputo prices for exactly 50% of the study period. Opportunities for gainful 
arbitrage between these two markets appear limited, compared to the other market pairs in the sample, with the 
Blantyre to Maputo trade route recording non-negative returns less than 10% of the time, and the Maputo to 
Blantyre route for about 20% of the time. When we consider the linkage between Blantyre and Mocuba 
however, we observe a stark difference, whereby the prices in Blantyre now almost always exceed Mocuba 
prices, and returns to arbitrage in the Mocuba to Blantyre trade route are almost always positive. In-country, we 
notice that Maputo and Mocuba are characterized by negative returns on the Maputo to Mocuba trade route, and 
positive returns with a frequency of slightly over 50% in the opposite direction. Notice that due to proximity of 
Mocuba to Blantyre, arbitrage returns are generally higher on this trade route, compared to Mocuba-Maputo.  
 
Market prices in Maputo almost always exceed the market prices in Gaborone, with positive returns to arbitrage 
on the Gaborone to Maputo trade direction expected about 60% of the time. Prices in Blantyre are also observed 
to exceed the Gaborone prices for most of the study period, although returns to trade on the Gaborone to 
Blantyre trade route are non-negative for only 40% of the time. A more detailed pair-wise description of the 
markets is presented in section 4 below to explain and explore further in parametric assessments, some of the 
observed price/transfer costs differences. For the moment, it suffices to note that these trends appear largely 
consistent with the observed trade frequencies presented in Table 3, with limited occasion of trade with 
negative returns, or the lack of trade with positive returns.  
 
4. RESULTS  
4.1  Level I Tests  
Results from the Level I analyses: Bivariate correlations, Granger causality tests, Co-integration tests and 
Ravallion tests are presented in Table 4. For the Ravallion test, Gauteng is chosen as the central market for the 
reasons that first, as observed from the trade statistics, bilateral trade relations exist between South Africa and 
every other country in the sample (Table 3), with a trade frequency of over 80% for trade of maize from South 
Africa. This country also produces over 50% of the southern Africa region’s maize output, is the largest source 
of imports for most of SADC11 (and for all the countries in the sample), and individually supplies 75% of all the 
maize traded in the region (FAOSTAT 2005). In addition, though not centrally located, Gauteng is connected 
through either road or rail networks to each of the markets (Figure 1), and based on the price correlation and 
causality tests (Table 5), the market prices for Gauteng are relatively highly correlated to all other market 
prices, with some degree of price causality observed between Gauteng market prices and prices prevailing in 
the rest of the markets.    
 
11 Southern African Development Community: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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Table 5: Level I Test Results  
Correlations  
 Gauteng  Gaborone  Blantyre  Maputo Mocuba 
Gauteng   1.000000  0.764788  0.285294  0.455502  0.061226 
Gaborone   0.764788  1.000000  0.084115  0.553064  0.002819 
Blantyre   0.285294  0.084115  1.000000  0.144453  0.347452 
Maputo  0.455502  0.553064  0.144453  1.000000  0.655694 
Mocuba  0.061226  0.002819  0.347452  0.655694  1.000000 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
  Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Probability 
  GAUTENG does not Granger Cause GABORONE  3.29900  0.00114** 
  GABORONE does not Granger Cause GAUTENG  2.48869  0.01152** 
  MAPUTO does not Granger Cause GABORONE  0.77202  0.64242 
  GABORONE does not Granger Cause MAPUTO  1.24550  0.27600 
  MOCUBA does no Grange Cause GABORONE  1.61046  0.12218 
  GABORONE does not Granger Cause MOCUBA  1.48013  0.16541 
  BLANTYRE does not Granger Cause GABORONE  0.83368  0.58641 
  GABORONE does not Granger Cause BLANTYRE  0.29127  0.97609 
  MAPUTO does not Granger Cause GAUTENG   0.49462  0.87520 
  GAUTENG does not Granger Cause MAPUTO  2.55029  0.01096** 
  MOCUBA does not Granger cause GAUTENG   0.93962  0.49456 
  GAUTENG does not Granger cause MOCUBA   3.04863  0.00287** 
  BLANTYRE does not Granger Cause GAUTENG  2.45264  0.01309** 
  GAUTENG does not Granger Cause BLANTYRE  1.60123  0.12159 
  BLANTYRE does not Granger Cause MAPUTO  3.44616  0.00105** 
  MAPUTO does not Granger Cause BLANTYRE  2.60165  0.01006** 
  MOCUBA does not Granger Cause BLANTYRE   3.09785  0.00273** 
  BLANTYRE does not Granger Cause MOCUBA   2.79726  0.00607** 
  MOCUBA does not Granger Cause MAPUTO   1.66494  0.10731 
  MAPUTO does not Granger Cause MOCUBA  1.95617  0.05229* 
Johansen Co-integration Tests Results 
Series  Eigenvalue  Likelihood Ratio Hypothesized Number of CE(s) in H0 
 0.094077  21.08706       None ** Gaborone Gauteng   
 0.029339  4.883661    At most 1 * 
 0.094606  19.67869       None * Gauteng Blantyre   
 0.027999  4.373356    At most 1 * 
 0.233366  41.85852       None ** Gauteng Maputo 
 0.054691  7.311602    At most 1 ** 
 0.169226  28.95427       None ** Gauteng Mocuba 
 0.043427  5.594127    At most 1 * 
 0.102219  19.83984       None * Gaborone Blantyre   
 0.020782  3.234155    At most 1 
 0.243596  37.62239       None ** Gaborone Maputo 
 0.010171  1.329063    At most 1 
 0.184354  26.87321       None ** Gaborone Mocuba 
 0.009460  1.197642    At most 1 
 0.227857  43.72418       None ** Maputo Blantyre 
 0.100379  12.69386    At most 1 ** 
 0.169260  29.65901       None ** Blantyre Mocuba  
 0.067832  8.148101    At most 1 ** 
 0.175919  35.67387       None ** Maputo Mocuba 
 0.085740  11.29465    At most 1 ** 
Ravallion Model Results 
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Market Pair  F-statistic  Probabilit
y  
Chi-Square Probability  Null Hypothesis  
124.7630 0.000000 1621.920 0.000000 βi0 = 1 and αis = βis = 0 for all s ** 
130.6737 0.000000 261.3474 0.000000 βi0=1 and ∑ns=1 αis + ∑ns=1 βis = 0** 
Gauteng Gaborone   
0.681247 0.410504 0.681247 0.409158 ∑ns=1 αis + ∑ns=0 βis = 1 
31.92906 0.000000 415.0778 0.000000 βi0 = 1 and αis = βis = 0 for all s ** 
6.295839 0.002427 12.59168 0.001844 βi0=1 and ∑ns=1 αis + ∑ns=1 βis = 0* 
Gauteng Blantyre   
1.476972 0.226355 1.476972 0.224249 ∑ns=1 αis + ∑ns=0 βis = 1 
29.57726 0.000000 384.5044 0.000000 βi0 = 1 and αis = βis = 0 for all s ** 
27.35773 0.000000 54.71546 0.000000 βi0=1 and ∑ns=1 αis + ∑ns=1 βis = 0** 
Gauteng Maputo 
0.093306 0.760582 0.093306 0.760015 ∑ns=1 αis + ∑ns=0 βis = 1 
38.98059 0.000000 506.7476 0.000000 βi0 = 1 and αis = βis = 0 for all s  
11.39633 0.000032 22.79265 0.000011 βi0=1 and ∑ns=1 αis + ∑ns=1 βis = 0 
Gauteng Mocuba 
5.392471 0.022065 5.392471 0.020224 ∑ns=1 αis + ∑ns=0 βis = 1 
                                          *(**) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level 
 
Results indicate that the Gauteng-Gaborone markets are characterized by the highest levels of price correlation, 
significant bidirectional Granger causality, and exhibit ‘long run integration’ as defined by Ravallion. Co-
integration holds with high levels of significance. The continuous, bidirectional trade between Botswana and 
South Africa, and close trade policy ties between the two countries, possibly explains the close linkages in price 
movements. Gaborone also seems influential in determining Gauteng prices, regardless of the fact that Gauteng 
is a much larger market, and Botswana in total imports only about 7% of South Africa’s total exports. The price 
discovery process differs in the two markets, with the state-owned parastatal, the Botswana Agricultural 
Marketing Board (BAMB) leading the course of maize prices in Botswana, whereas the South Africa Futures 
Exchanges (SAFEX) – a more market-oriented institution – is influential in maize pricing on the South African 
markets. Results indicate that despite these differences, a close relationship in price movements exists between 
these two markets, and prices in one market are influential in determining prices in the other. 
 
The Gauteng-Maputo market pair is also characterized by substantial price correlation, significant 
unidirectional causality in the Gauteng to Maputo direction, highly significant price co-integration, and long-
run Ravallion integration. Similar trends are observed between Gauteng and Mocuba. Trade between Gauteng 
and Maputo is bidirectional, continuous in the Gauteng to Maputo direction and discontinuous in opposite 
direction, whereas limited trade is predicted between Gauteng and Mocuba. The close price co-movements 
between Maputo and Mocuba possibly account for the (indirect) significant price causality observed between 
Mocuba and Gauteng. Because Gauteng is a larger market than either Maputo or Mocuba, and due to the 
observed trade flows, we expect that price causality move in the observed direction. Gauteng and Blantyre also 
follow similar trends with the exception that in this case causality seems to run in an unexpected direction, from 
Blantyre to Gauteng, and co-integration holds with less significance. Prices in Malawi are largely market 
determined, with the former state parastatal ADMARC now privatized, although and the state run National 
Food Reserve Agency remains a significant player in the market. Thus we would expect that because trade 
between Malawi and Gauteng is predominantly from South Africa to Malawi: imports from South Africa 
accounting for 25% of Malawi’s total imports (and only 5% of South Africa’s aggregate exports), whereas 
South Africa’s imports from Malawi account for less than 0.1% of total imports, price causality would also 
follow the same trend. It is possible, however, that causality is demand driven, and the dominant seller is 
responsive to its markets, which seems to be the case with Gauteng relative to both Gaborone and Blantyre.  
  
Blantyre and Maputo exhibit significant bidirectional causality and co-integration holds with high levels of 
significance. Price correlations are however relatively lower than observed elsewhere in the sample. We 
observe, as expected, that more significant correlation and causality is expected in the price relationship 
between Blantyre and Mocuba. Trade between Malawi and Mozambique is bidirectional but discontinuous, and 
given the structure of Mozambique’s regional ecological conditions and subsequent differences in maize 
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productivity, it stands to reason that very little of this trade represents direct trade between Maputo and 
Blantyre, so that these markets are mostly linked through indirect trade. Considering the limited integration 
between the southern and northern regions of Mozambique (Tostão and Brorsen 2005, Tschirley et al 2005, 
Arndt forthcoming), we may also assume limited price co-movements between Maputo and Mocuba, hence 
limited indirect trade and price relations between Maputo and Blantyre. The high degrees of causality and co-
integration between both market pairs (Maputo-Mocuba and Maputo-Blantyre) seem to suggest that although 
these markets appear segmented, important, possibly indirect, feed back relationships exist in the price 
discovery process.  
 
The Gaborone-Maputo and Gaborone-Blantyre market pairs follow a similar trend exhibiting limited price co-
movement, as evidenced by the lack of causal relations, and less significant co-integration. Instantaneous price 
responses are not observed in this sample of markets, although long-run price co-movements are also observed. 
These results make sense because the two market pairs are essentially segmented (not linked through trade), 
though sharing a common trade partner, Gauteng. The observed lagged price responses could be an indication 
of these markets responding to changes in each other’s prices through Gauteng’s price responses.  
 
4.2  Level II and Level III Test Results  
In this section, the Parity Bounds Model (PBM) and the Barrett-Li Model (BLM) are used to evaluate the levels 
of integration and efficiency in the sample markets. The Parity Bounds Model described in equations (16) 
through (18) can be compared to the Barrett-Li Model described in equations (19) through (30) as follows:  
 
RETURNS TO ARBITRAGE  
Zero Returns (Rjit = 0) Positive Returns (Rjit > 0) Negative Returns (Rjit < 0) 
Positive Trade  Regime 1: perfect integration Regime 3: imperfect integration  Regime 5: imperfect integration  
B
LM
  
No Trade Regime 2: perfect integration Regime 4: segmented disequilibrium  Regime 6: segmented equilibrium 
PB
M
        - Regime 1 Regime 3  Regime 2 
 
The log of the maximum likelihood function defined in equation (30) is used to estimate the parameters λ1, λ2 
and λ3 as defined above for the Parity Bounds Model, and α, σv and σu, initially holding Tjit constant. We use the 
optimization program Solver, which utilizes the generalized reduced gradient (GRG) algorithm, implemented in 
an enhanced version of the GRG2 code (Lasden and Waren 1979), in solving the maximization problem. The 
resultant parameter estimates are presented in Table 4. These results and the discussion that follows focus on 
the regime probability estimates computed using the prevailing markets prices. Trade ‘unit value’ based 
estimates are also computed (Appendix 2), and are used mainly as a cautionary base for the results presented in 
Table 6.   
 
Within the PBM, a priori restrictions have to be made on the trade variable, for meaningful market 
integration/efficiency conclusions to be made for market interactions such as those represented by regimes 2 
and 3. This is because based on contemporary definitions of integration and efficiency, regime 2 could describe 
efficient but segmented markets if no trade occurs, or inefficient but integrated markets if trade occurs. Baulch 
1994 imposed the restriction of ‘no trade’ on regime 2, so that this regime is consistent with efficiency, and of 
positive trade on regime 3, so that this regime represents inefficiency. In the PBM analysis performed in this 
paper, no a priori trade restrictions are made. Rather, the PBM analysis is complemented by a non-parametric 
assessment of the markets in which the annual trade data are incorporated to provide a more informative 
characterization of the markets. The limitations of the trade variable outlined in section 3.2 prevent the 
assessment of the complete set of markets in the sample using the Barrett-Li model. Therefore only a subset of 
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the sample markets for which credible trade statistics were available is analyzed using the full fledged Barrett-
Li model.   
 
The markets of choice for the BLM are (1) Gaborone and Gauteng, (2) Gauteng and Maputo, and (3) Mocuba 
and Blantyre. The sub-sample is used to illustrate the more informative type of analyses that could be 
performed with accurate, frequent data on market-specific cross-border trade flows for the region. Compared to 
an evaluation of market integration and efficiency at a national level, this analysis is superior in that it focuses 
directly on the source/destination of trade within each country, enabling us to identify with greater certainty the 
sources of inefficiency, and to more concretely identify the necessary policy changes. The resulting parameter 
estimates are presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 6: Summary of Parity Bounds Model Results  
Direction of Trade Regime Probability 
 λ1 λ2 λ3 σu σv α 
Maputo to Blantyre  0.01000 0.905144 0.083856 95.588242 72.043095 -21.967233 
Blantyre to Maputo  0.053378 0.945622 0.00 135.528470 50.684218 -14.012201 
Maputo to Mocuba  0.035336 0.963664 0.000 57.481217 45.842464 -160.47399 
Mocuba to Maputo  0.522907 0.326970 0.150123 58.957983 38.017453 14.97875 
Gauteng to Blantyre 0.440883 0.000 0.559116 125.0447 28.33425 -7.23522 
Blantyre to Gauteng  0.012522 0.98747 0.000 139.85624 0.0000135 -69.23263 
Gaborone to Maputo  0.470590 0.000 0.52841 65.493757 34.294812 -10.55721 
Maputo to Gaborone 0.025345 0.973655 0.000 71.882237 29.788798 -43.56793 
Gaborone to Blantyre  0.498133 0.000 0.500867 148.85151 26.419679 -44.23422 
Blantyre to Gaborone  0.005448 0.993552 0.000 147.87480 19.898351 -43.61586 
 
Table 7: Summary of Barrett-Li Model Results 
Direction of Trade Regime Probability 
 λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 λ5 λ6 σu σv α 
Gauteng to Gaborone 0.25010 0.000 0.62924 0.000 0.11936 0.000 42.5394 0.000001 -6.3584 
Gaborone to Gauteng 0.000 0.01584 0.03903 0.06452 0.11606 0.76355 38.6356 1.950421 -19.3133 
Gauteng to Maputo  0.00969 0.000 0.89321 0.000 0.09709 0.000 74.9977 0.001 1.09869 
Maputo to Gauteng  0.10743 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.04696 0.84441 61.2558 31.15583 -42.4078 
Blantyre to Mocuba  0.000 0.06325 0.04154 0.000 0.11601 0.77810 109.979 32.96456 -72.5606 
Mocuba to Blantyre  0.22978 0.08769 0.61296 0.06747 0.000 0.000 117.702 37.43352 17.66256 
 
Results from the PBM and BLM analyses indicate that significant efficiency exists between the markets pairs 
considered in this analysis, with most market pairs recording frequent (5% to 52%) zero returns to arbitrage in 
at least one trade direction. The lowest level of efficiency is observed for the Blantyre-Maputo market pair, in 
which the probability of being in regime 1 is relatively small and returns to arbitrage are generally negative in 
either trade direction. We also notice that the probability of being in the positive returns regimes increases non-
trivially when trade unit values are used instead of market prices for most market pairs, indicating that countries 
on average pay more per unit of maize imported than the prevailing prices in their local markets. In the pair-
wise assessment that follows integration and efficiency implication are drawn from these results.  
 
Because regime frequencies are defined for each market pair in a direction specific manner (generally λkji ≠ 
λkij), integration and efficiency are also seem to be uniquely defined for specific trade directions. According to 
Barrett and Li 2001 we can maintain direction specific descriptions of markets with regards to the concept of 
market integration, since tradability and contestability are also unidirectional concepts. However, because 
equilibrium is an omni-directional concept, we would generally need to establish for each market pair, a range 
of frequencies describing the lower and upper bounds for efficiency. Thus in the following discussion, 
efficiency conclusions are drawn by considering regime frequencies and trade trends for both trade directions.   
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Gauteng – Gaborone: This market pair is in perfect integration with a frequency of at least 25% observed on 
the Gauteng to Gaborone trade route. Trade is bidirectional between these markets, continuous on the South 
Africa to Botswana trade route and discontinuous on the Botswana to South Africa route. Because very limited 
trade occurs from Gaborone to Gauteng, the frequently observed negative returns are consistent also consistent 
with efficiency. Cases of imperfect integration also exist, at a fairly high frequency on the Gauteng to Gaborone 
trade route where trade fails to exhaust arbitrage returns, and at lower frequency where trade occurs in spite of 
negative returns (observed in both trade directions). The occurrence of regime 4 (positive returns without trade) 
concurrently with regime 5 in the Gaborone to Gauteng trade route appears to indicate that although trade in 
this direction is limited, it is often not consistent with the limited occasion in which Gaborone prices exceed 
Gauteng prices, an indication of inefficiency in such market interactions.  
 
We observe at a national level that the per-unit value of maize sold from Botswana to South Africa generally 
exceeds the market prices prevailing in Gauteng, so that with these ‘export prices’, positive returns to arbitrage 
are now expected for about 25% of the time on the Gaborone to Gauteng trade route (see Appendix 2). Some 
possible explanations could be given for these seeming disparities in prices: first, that some form of product 
differentiation exists, that allows Botswana exports to fetch a higher than average market price in South Africa, 
second that maize exports from Botswana are destined to markets other than Gauteng, where higher market 
prices prevail, or third that some form of inefficiency exists in the markets to sustain these price differences. We 
dismiss the first possibility based on the observation that the maize grain under study in this paper is a fairly 
homogenous product. On the second possibility, an assessment of South Africa’s maize producing regions and 
deficit regions, considering proximity of these regions to Botswana, indicates that Gauteng is in fact on of the 
major maize producing regions in the country12, and we might expected prices in other deficit regions or such 
as Northern Cape to offer higher prices for Botswana’s exports. It is also possible that South African consumers 
pay more for maize sourced from Botswana either due to imperfect information on prices prevailing elsewhere 
in the market (especially possible for consumers located in remote parts of country, close to the Botswana 
exporting regions), or due to hidden costs imbedded in currency conversion13 and transfer costs. Note, however, 
that Botswana’s total exports of maize to South Africa are rather insignificant, making up a mere 0.5% of the 
total trade volumes between these two markets. 
 
Gauteng – Maputo: This market pair is characterized mostly by imperfect integration with positive returns to 
arbitrage, whereby the flow of maize of Gauteng and neighboring regions to Maputo fails to exhaust the 
arbitrage returns, with limited occurrence of regime 1. This positive returns imperfect integration appears to be 
the dominant form of inefficiency for this market pair, negative returns imperfect integration is also observed 
though with a much smaller frequency in both trade directions. The former is probably explained by the 
presence of a restrictive 17% VAT on imported maize meant for re-sale in grain form, that substantially 
increases the transfer costs from grain traders. The latter indicates that the very limited trade predicted from 
Maputo to Gauteng occurs despite the negative arbitrage profits observed regularly on this trade route. At 
national level, South Africa and Mozambique, trade is almost continuous on the South Africa to Mozambique 
trade route, with discontinuous and mostly trivial trade in the opposite direction (often less than 5% of 
Mozambique’s total exports and an insignificant proportion of South Africa’s total imports). Because the trade 
variable is included as a ‘trade or no-trade’ dummy variable, these trade proportions tend to be masked in 
observed regime frequencies.  
 
At the inter-country level of assessment, it appears the positive trade flows from Mozambique to South Africa 
do in fact constitute some form of inefficiency since, considering only market prices, we note that the market 
prices prevailing in South African are generally not large enough to provide an incentive for this positive flows 
of maize from Mozambique to South Africa, even when we assume that the maize was sourced from the lower 
12 South Africa’s major maize producing region includes parts of Gauteng, North-West, Free State and Mpumalanga.  
13 Possible given that the Botswana Pula is generally stronger than the South African Rand, so that prices quoted in Pula may appear 
lower they actually are when converted to their Rand equivalents.  
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price, surplus regions of Mozambique such as Mocuba, since in that case much higher transfer costs are have to 
be incurred. Only when per-unit trade values are considered are non-negative returns to trade expected on this 
trade route with a frequency of up to 20%. Thus it appears that Mozambican imports attract an above average 
price in South African markets, for at least parts of the seasons when trade is observed, probably for reasons 
similar to those discussed above for the Botswana case. Occasionally, however, positive trade is observed from 
Mozambique to South Africa that is supported by neither prevailing market prices nor per-unit trade values of 
traded maize.  
 
Blantyre – Mocuba: For this market pair, perfect integration is observed with a frequency of up to 22%, where 
zero returns with trade are observed on the Mocuba to Blantyre trade route, whereas regime 2 efficiency is 
observed in the opposite direction. More regularly, positive returns imperfect integration is observed in the 
Mocuba to Blantyre trade direction and segmented equilibrium in the Blantyre to Mocuba trade direction. We 
observe in this case that prevailing market prices in Mocuba are consistently lower than Blantyre prices, 
accounting for the frequently negative returns and the limited of trade on the Blantyre to Mocuba trade route. 
Considering that Mocuba lies in Mozambique’s maize surplus region, whereas Blantyre lies in the southern, 
mostly deficit region of Malawi, the observed price and trade trends are expected. It appears that this limited 
trade is also largely inefficient, with negative arbitrage returns, as evidenced by the occurrence of regime 5. In 
the opposite trade direction, trade generally fails to exhaust arbitrage profits and occasionally, positive returns 
go entirely unexploited (regime 4), possibly due to inadequacy or seasonality of maize supply on the 
Mozambican side. We note again here that the proportion of Malawi’s exports to Mozambique is rather small, 
so that positive trade in this direction accounts for at most 1.6% of total exports from Malawi (about 0.1% of 
Mozambique’s imports).  
 
Blantyre – Maputo: Perfect integration is observed with a frequency of up to 5% for this market pair, where 
zero excess profits prevail more in the Blantyre to Maputo trade direction. The Maputo to Blantyre trade route 
is instead characterized by positive returns to arbitrage of comparable frequency, and for both trade routes, 
returns to arbitrage are negative with a frequency of over 90%. These bid-directional negative returns are an 
indication that market prices in these two markets move in close magnitude and trend (supported by the level I 
tests) so that price differences are rarely large enough to cover transfer costs. Given limited trade between 
Blantyre and Maputo, these markets though segmented, appear largely efficient (in segmented equilibrium). 
The only form of inefficiency observed here is the segmented disequilibrium expected in the Maputo to 
Blantyre trade direction with a frequency of about 8%, where failure to take advantage of observed positive 
returns is possibly due to hidden transfer costs or structural barriers to grain movement. Given the relatively 
low frequency of positive returns however, these could simply be a result of exchange rate fluctuations in either 
Mozambique or Malawi, generally not sustained long enough to provide incentives for trade.   
 
At national level, trade between Malawi and Mozambique is predominantly in the Mozambique to Malawi trade 
direction, often between Malawi and the maize surplus northern region of Mozambique (Tschirley at al 2005). 
Considering the lower market prices in the North, represented in this analysis by Mocuba, we observe that the 
returns to arbitrage on maize movement from this region to Blantyre are in fact frequently positive (68%), 
indicating incentive for, and possibly explaining, the frequent positive trade observed between the two 
countries. When per-unit trade values are considered, the incentives are more pronounced, as computed ‘import 
prices’ in Malawi generally exceed Blantyre prices.  On the Malawi to Mozambique trade route, when per-unit 
trade values are considered no significant differences in the prices received for maize on the Mozambique 
markets are observed (Mozambique appears to pay the market prices for its imports from Malawi).  
 
Maputo – Mocuba: To evaluate the level on integration and efficiency between the southern and northern 
regions of Mozambique, the price, transfer costs and trade relations between Maputo and Mocuba are 
considered. Note though that in terms of geographic location, Mocuba is more centrally located than most 
surplus producing areas of the northern region, so that transfer costs are not as restrictive, and trade is in fact 
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observed though with a frequency of only about 2.25% (Tostão and Brorsen 2005) from Mocuba to Maputo. 
We observe that for this market pair efficiency holds with a high frequency, up to 52% in zero returns (mostly 
without trade) type of efficiency, and up to 96% in segmented equilibrium. Inefficiency is observed in the 
Mocuba to Maputo trade route, whereby with a frequency of up to 15%, positive returns to arbitrage appear to 
go unexploited. An assessment of the seasonality trend in arbitrage returns on the Mocuba to Maputo trade 
route indicates that these are highest in the months immediately following harvest, when the prices in Mocuba 
are lowest. Therefore it does not seem that seasonal supply constraints inhibit the flow of maize from the 
surplus to the deficit region. Interesting to note though is the presence of an alternative recipient for the maize 
surpluses in the northern region (Malawi) where, due to proximity of market, larger arbitrage returns can be 
realized. The southern region is thus served by South Africa’s surplus region – also more closely located and 
serviced by an efficient transport system14. Thus it appears that maize trade within Mozambique is responsive 
to arbitrage opportunities in a largely efficient manner, given current location of surplus/deficit regions and 
subsequent transport costs.  
 
Gauteng – Blantyre: In this market pair, perfect integration is observed with a frequency of up to 44%, with 
zero returns to arbitrage observed predominantly in the Gauteng to Blantyre trade direction. For the Blantyre to 
Gauteng trade route, returns to arbitrage are predominantly negative. These trends are expected because 
Malawi, though occasionally producing maize in excess of its domestic needs, is generally a deficit producer of 
maize, hence the higher maize prices observed in Blantyre compared to Gauteng prices. Given these arbitrage 
returns, we expect Gauteng to export to Blantyre, but not the other way round.  
 
Trade at national level is however observed to be bidirectional, though generally flowing from South Africa to 
Malawi, with less frequent grain movement from Malawi to South Africa. Exports from Malawi at the formal 
level currently are mostly through the National Reserve Agency – the management board for the country’s 
strategic grain reserves – and in the early 1990’s were through the then state-owned parastatal ADMARC. Thus 
exports tend to be more responsive to the level of stocks at hand, rather than seasonality of production per se, 
and it appears that export prices respond more to the presence of a maize glut in the domestic markets, than to 
the presence of arbitrage incentive elsewhere (Zant 2005). In terms of proportion, exports to South Africa make 
up a very small share of Malawi’s total exports (often between 2% and 4%), and an even smaller proportion of 
South Africa’s total imports. Given these observations, we may expect little market price induced maize 
movement from Malawi’s Blantyre market to Gauteng, so that at the inter-market level (compared to the inter-
national level), the frequent negative returns to arbitrage observed on this route are consistent with efficiency. 
Trade in the Gauteng to Blantyre direction leads to an exhaustion of arbitrage profits with a substantially higher 
frequency, although different forms of inefficiency could possibly exist in both directions, in the forms of either 
imperfect integration with positive returns if the positive returns observed with a frequency of 55% happen to 
coincide with the seasons in which trade is observed, or segmented disequilibrium is these positive returns are 
consistent with periods in which trade is not observed. The exact type of inefficiency can be established with 
monthly trade data for this market pair.   
 
Considering the per-unit values of maize traded between these two markets, the ‘export price’ received for 
Malawi’s maize exports to South Africa generally exceeds Gauteng prices, so that at these apparently higher 
prices, positive returns to arbitrage would be expected for on the Malawi to South Africa trade route about 25% 
of time (Appendix 2). Note however that occasional positive trade from Malawi to South Africa is also 
observed, even for those years in when the returns to arbitrage (readjusted to the per-unit value of trade) are 
negative – a hint for some form of inefficiency on this route for trade at national level. Additionally, 
considering the lower maize prices in Malawi’s maize surplus northern region, we observe that returns to 
arbitrage from exports to South Africa still generate negative returns, given the higher transfer costs now 
14 The distance from Maputo to say Gauteng is less than half the distance to Mocuba, and given the geographic location of Maputo 
lies almost entirely on the South African side of the border, where more efficient transport network systems are in place.  
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incurred. On the South Africa to Malawi trade route, per unit trade value are also observed to consistently 
exceed local prices.  
 
Gaborone – Maputo: This market pair is characterized by perfect integration expected with a frequency of up to 
45%, where zero returns to arbitrage are expected mainly on the Gaborone to Maputo trade route, and 
segmented equilibrium expected with a frequency of up to 97% observed on the opposite trade route. These 
results indicate that though no trade in maize grain is ever observed between these two markets during the study 
period, significant integration holds, evidenced by contestability of markets through zero arbitrage returns. Note 
however that the positive returns sometimes observed on the Gaborone to Maputo route to go unexploited, 
indicating also the existence of segmented disequilibrium on this trade route, with an estimated frequency of 
over 50%. This trend is possibly due to the fact that Botswana is a deficit market and net importer of maize, 
thus does not possess the supply capacity to export. We would expect though in an efficient market system re-
exports of maize from Botswana’s markets to take advantage of the positive arbitrage returns expected 
elsewhere in the region.  
 
Gaborone – Blantyre: Regime frequencies and trade trends for this market pair are very similar to those 
observed for the Gaborone – Maputo market pair: returns to trade on the Gaborone to Blantyre trade route are 
expected to be zero for about 47% of the time and positive for the remainder of the time, the Blantyre to 
Gaborone trade route is characterized by negative returns to trade for most of the study period, and no trade is 
observed between these markets during the study period. The positive returns to arbitrage expected on the 
Gaborone to Blantyre trade route again seem to go unexploited, indicating segmented disequilibrium.   
 
In concluding this section, we explore some of the reasons for the market segmentation and different forms of 
inefficiency observed in the sample markets. Imperfect integration with positive returns is often a result of 
either insufficient arbitrage or significant unobservable transfer costs. Imperfect integration with negative 
returns is explained as resulting from temporary disequilibria that arise from information and contracting lags, 
or the existence of significant unobservable transactions benefits. In this sample of southern Africa’s maize 
markets we have market pairs for which positive trade is observed even when the observable price differences 
are negative (for example trade from Botswana to South Africa and on occasion, from Malawi to Mozambique). 
In such cases, it does not appear that hidden costs are the reason for trade. Plausibly, trade is a result of inter-
country transport bottlenecks that force excess producers located close enough to the border to sell across the 
border for less, if that market is more easily accessible. If these producers acquire most of their daily goods and 
services from across the border, near batter trade of maize grain for consumer goods is not uncommon. In such 
cases, and also considering the differences in currency denominations and exchange rate fluctuations, 
observable price differences could easily become ‘hidden’ to smallholder producers and informal traders of 
maize. As has already been suggested earlier however, in some cases, returns to arbitrage may appear negative, 
when in fact the price paid to the trader exceeds prevailing market prices in either the source or the destination 
markets. In a competitive market, we expect that these higher import prices would encourage an influx of maize 
that eventually drives the price of imports down to the local levels. In that case, import prices ought to be 
observed to converge to local prices. However if the market does not operate competitively, for example when 
the state is a significant player in grain trade, we have cases in which the government is willing to pay more for 
imports than it eventually sells the imported commodities for on the local market – a form of subsidy often used 
in shortage periods to support food insecurity households. In a country such as Malawi, where the state is still a 
dominant player in maize importation, such trends are not uncommon15.   
 
With regards unexhausted or unexploited positive returns to arbitrage, it is possible that significant 
unobservable transfer costs exist. As noted earlier in the description of the transfer costs variable used in this 
analysis, this variable does not account for costs such as insurance, spoilage, border inefficiency costs, 
15 See also Zant 2005 
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contracting costs, sanitary and phyto-sanitary compliance costs, exchange rate risk, and a host of other trade-
related costs. Barriers to trade may also be structural, so that even when commercial traders may be willing to 
take advantage of higher market prices in a neighboring country, government restrictions on grain movement 
may prevent that from happening. The markets in Malawi certainly have been subject to such regulatory 
restrictions in the past, though reform of such policy has been observed in recent years. We also have cases in 
which supply side constraints prevent countries from taking advantage of these arbitrage opportunities. A good 
example is the Gaborone to Maputo, or the Gaborone to Blantyre maize markets. The lack of trade despite the 
seemingly large arbitrage profits may appear puzzling, however considering that Botswana is already a maize 
deficit country, little capacity exists to produce for the export market. In this case, efficiency in trade with a 
common third partner (for example South Africa) would be expected to drive down these excess profits16. 
Imperfect information and risk aversion also play a role here, where issues such as differences in currency 
denominations for prices, imperfect information on transfer costs, imperfect exchange rate markets, and 
imperfect information on how to enter foreign markets may inhibit trade.  
 
5.   CONCLUSION  
As the SADC region grapples with the recurrent issue of food insecurity, reference is often made to increased 
intra-regional trade as an important integral element of a comprehensive food strategy. The assumption is that 
as countries reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, they become more integrated and more efficient, 
facilitating commodity movement at lower transfer costs, hence lower prices to the final consumer. With the 
reform of maize markets in most of the region in the past decade, from controlled to market-oriented, we 
evaluate the extent to which these markets have become integrated and efficient, and identify the nature of 
inefficiency where it exists. This paper employs a number of price-based market integration tests, in 
collaboration with the more sophisticated Parity Bounds and Barrett-Li models and comprehensive non-
parametric descriptions of market pairs, to provide a holistic assessment of pair-wise market interaction, in the 
process also providing a comparison of the methods as measures of integration and efficiency.    
 
South Africa and Malawi follow similar trends, although in this case perfect integration holds with higher 
frequency, and imperfect integration with negative return is occasionally observed from trade in the Malawi to 
South Africa trade route. Malawi and Mozambique’s Northern region exhibit perfect integration of a relatively 
high frequency, although imperfect integration with positive returns appears dominant on the Mozambique to 
Malawi route. Trade is bidirectional and discontinuous, predominantly in the Mozambique to Malawi direction. 
The market interactions between Botswana and Mozambique’s Southern region or Malawi follow a related 
trend exhibiting market segmentation as evidenced by the lack of trade. Efficiency holds with a fairly high 
frequency mostly in the form of segmented equilibrium, although significant segmented disequilibrium on the 
Botswana to Mozambique/Malawi route is also observed.  
 
On a market pair level, results indicate that the Gauteng-Gaborone markets are characterized by the highest 
levels of price correlation, significant bidirectional Granger causality, continuous bidirectional trade and exhibit 
‘long run integration’ as defined by Ravallion. Co-integration also holds with high levels of significance. This 
market pair exhibits fairly high level of perfect integration as defined by Barrett and Li 2001, though 
concurrently with imperfect integration of substantial frequency, a result of the persistence of excess profits on 
the Gauteng to Gaborone trade direction, whereas trade seems to occur despite negative returns to arbitrage on 
the Gaborone to Gauteng trade direction.  
 
For South Africa and Mozambique, trade is bidirectional and discontinuous, with low frequency of perfect 
integration. Trade between South Africa and Mozambique’s Southern region generally fails to exhaust arbitrage 
profits, and though integrated, the market pair appears largely inefficient. In particular, the Gauteng-Maputo 
market pair is characterized by substantial price correlation, significant unidirectional causality in the Gauteng 
16 Note that in this case South Africa is extracting supernatural profits from both markets. 
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to Maputo direction, highly significant price co-integration, and long-run Ravallion integration. This market 
pair, however, exhibits very low frequency of perfect integration, with the Gauteng to Maputo trade route 
characterized mainly by excess trade profits, whereas the Maputo to Gauteng trade direction is often in 
segmented equilibrium as it is to be in imperfect integration with negative profits. Gauteng and Blantyre follow 
similar trends, except in this case causality appears to run in the Blantyre to Gauteng direction, co-integration 
holds but with less significance, and perfect integration holds with slightly higher frequency17.  
 
Malawi and Mozambique maize exhibit somewhat different forms of interaction between Malawi and southern 
and northern regions of Mozambique. For the Blantyre-Maputo market pair causality is significant 
bidirectional, co-integration holds with high levels of significance, and perfect integration holds with a 
frequency of up to 25%. Price correlations are however much lower, very limited trade is observed, and 
frequent market segmentation is observed. Blantyre and Mocuba are characterized by higher price correlations, 
bidirectional causality, and significant co-integration. Perfect integration is observed with a fairly high 
frequency where zero arbitrage returns observed in both trade directions, with more significant positive returns 
imperfect integration on the observed in the Mocuba to Blantyre trade direction and segmented equilibrium in 
the Blantyre to Mocuba trade direction.   
 
The relationship between Gaborone and either Maputo or Blantyre follows a clear, related trend, of limited 
price co-movements evidenced by fairly low price correlations, the lack of causal relations, and less significant 
co-integration. Market integration and efficiency however hold with a fairly high frequency in either pair, 
though market segmentation appears dominant – efficient in the Maputo to Gaborone or Blantyre to Gaborone 
trade directions, and inefficient otherwise.   
 
Overall, the southern Africa maize markets considered in the sample seem to exhibit significant frequency of 
market integration, indicating tradability commodities and contestability of markets. Efficiency holds less 
frequently, although non-trivially, we observe that for those markets characterized by near continuous trade 
returns to arbitrage are exhausted for about 25% of the time. Often however, when trade is observed, efficiency 
appears to be weakened by insufficient arbitrage, possibly a result of non-cost barriers to trade (infrastructural 
or regulatory), imperfect information, or supply side constraints. For these markets, positive trade is also 
occasionally observed when arbitrage returns are negative, possibly due to contracting lags, and exchange rate 
fluctuations. Where trade is not observed, efficiency appears to hold with a slightly higher frequency (up to 
45%), so that the lack of trade is often justified by the lack of positive arbitrage returns. Significant segmented 
equilibrium also seems to characterize these markets, where again the lack of trade is consistent with expected 
arbitrage returns. For these markets, efficiency is also occasionally compromised by insufficient arbitrage, 
whereby trade sometime fails to occur even when the returns to arbitrage incentives appear favorable 
(segmented disequilibrium). Therefore in order of frequency, we observe a high frequency of imperfect 
integration (regimes 3) and segmented equilibrium (regime 6), a fairly regular occurrence of perfect integration 
(regimes 1 and 2), and irregular occurrence of segmented disequilibrium (regimes 4) and the negative returns 
type of imperfect integration (regime 5). In specific markets, import prices consistently exceed domestic market 
prices, an inefficient outcome that appears to result from the involvement of the state in grain trade, where 
market conduct often is driven by non-profit objectives. These results suggest a need for policy intervention in 
the areas of improved productivity and access to information to takes advantage of unexploited arbitrage 
opportunities, and in the longer term, dealing with structural barriers to trade that prevent market entry 
especially where positive returns are currently observed. In some cases though, the lack of trade is an efficient 
outcome that probably requires no immediate policy interventions. 
 
The main limitation of this study, already mentioned earlier, is the inadequate trade statistics of high frequency, 
that prevented the application of the Barrett-Li model to all market pairs. The study also uses imperfect transfer 
17 The higher transfer costs between Gauteng and Blantyre, compared to Maputo, possibly erode some of the excess profits observed 
in Gauteng’s exports to Maputo.   
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costs data, extrapolated from isolated point estimates, obtained from various sources for different time periods. 
Such inconsistencies increase measurement error, and compromise the accuracy of parameter estimates. More 
work is required to accurately measure these variables, and monitor trade between specific markets in the 
region. In addition, the analysis suffers most of the limitations of parity bounds models identified in section 3.1, 
such as susceptibility of parameter estimates to choice of probability distribution functions, and the static nature 
of the analyses. Similar studies handle the former through Monte Carlo sensitivity analyses, to evaluate 
robustness of the chosen distributional forms (Barrett and Li 2001, Barrett et al 2000, Baulch 1997). Similar 
robustness test for this study would provide additional information on the validity of test results.  
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Appendix 2: Summary of Parity Bounds Model Results, Trade unit value adjusted  
Direction of Trade Regime Probability 
 λ1 λ2 λ3 σu σv α 
Gauteng to Gaborone 0.001 0.04257 0.95642 55.37334 33.3178 12.35310 
Gaborone to Gauteng 0.00968 0.72816 0.26214 49.66583 0.001 -12.91688 
Gauteng to Maputo  0.009695 0.097091 0.89321 74.99773 0.001 1.09869 
Maputo to Gauteng  0.03892 0.63149 0.32958 79.47493 1.52442 -62.00201 
Gauteng to Blantyre 0.400216 0.001 0.598784 123.6662 27.89085 -7.38528 
Blantyre to Gauteng  0.009768 0.81586 0.174371 155.4237 0.000017 -69.23264 
Maputo to Blantyre  0.009332 0.640991 0.349676 96.05077 0.000001 -1.56956 
Blantyre to Maputo  0.255405 0.681504 0.06309 146.10972 52.27847 -36.66282 
 
 
 
 
 

